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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
intoxication may be averred in order to nullify the contract varies. 5 A North
Dakota statute requires that a contract must be rescinded promptly upon dis-
covery of facts giving rise to a right of recission. 6 Failure to disaffirm within a
".reasonable" time after acquiring such knowledge is deemed an election to
affirm it. What constitutes a "reasonable" time is not definite but depends
upon the facts of the particular case.8 The North Dakota Supreme Court has
suggested that the morning after the contract was entered into is a reasonable
time, 9 while a period of seven years was considered too long.1° A party was
held not guilty of laches when he failed to rescind almost a year after dis-
covery of fraud and when no rights of third parties intervened and he had
received no consideration."
There is a presumption that a signed contract is valid." This requires the
party asserting intoxication as a defense to assume the responsibility and bur-
den of .proving it. 3 There must be clear and convincing proof of excessive
intoxication before the court will sustain this defense. 4 The degree of in-
toxication is a question of fact," and the evidence is usually established by
the testimony of witnesses, but their testimony is subject to the final deternli-
nation by the jury.' 6
The holding in the principal case conforms to the general rule that there
must be concrete and conclusive proof of excessive intoxication. The mere
fact that the party attempting to rescind was known to have been a habitual
drunkard will not give rise to a right to rescind,17 unless he was excessively
intoxicated at the execution of the contract.' 8 In the instant case the Admin-
istratrix failed to establish such proof and was required to execute the deed as
a contractual obligation of the deceased.' 9
RONALD SPLITT.
CRIMINAL LAW - NATIONAL MOTOR VEHICLE THEFT ACT - CONSTRUCTION
OF "STOLEN." - Appellant was convicted under the Dyer Act for having
appropriated to his own use and driven across a state line, an automobile
bailed to him by the conditional vendee for the purpose of returning it to the
conditional vendor. The conviction was affinned on appeal by the United
States Circuit Court of Appeals which held that the word "stolen" as used in
5. Mann Chevrolet Co. v. Associates' Inv. Co., 125 F.2d 778 (8th Cir. 1942)
(dictum).
6. N. D. Rev. Code § 9-0904 (1) (1943).
7. Frankish v. Fed. Mortg. Co., 30 Cal. App.2d 700, 87 P,2d 90 (1939); Hauge v.
Bye, 51 N. D. 848, 201 N.W. 159 (1924); Spoonheim v. Spoonheim, 14 N. D. 380,
104 N.W. 845 (1905).
8. Mann Chevrolet Co. v. Associates' Inv. Co., 125 F.2d 778 (8th Cir. 1942).
9. Hauge v. Bye, 51 N. D. 848, 201 N.W. 159 (1924).
10. Spoonhein v. Spoonheim, 14 N. D. 380, 104 N.W. 845 (1905).
11: Deasy v. Taylor, 39 Cal. App. 235, 178 Pac. 538 (1919).
12. Bradley v. Industrial Commission, 51 Ariz. 291, 76 P.2d 745 (1938); Indemnity
Ins. Co. v. Macatee Ins. Co., 129 Tex. 166, 101 S.W.2d 553 (1397). See also Crutcher
Laboratory v. Crutcher, 288 Ky. 709, 157 S.W.2d 314, 319 (1942).
13. Lyon v. Jackson, 132 N.E.2d 779 (Ohio 1955). See also Brugman v. Brugman,
93 Neb. 408, 140 N.W. 781 (1913).
14. Emerson v. Shirley, 188 La. 196, 175 So. 909 (1937); In re Null's Estate, 302
Pa. 64, 153 At. 137 (1930).
15. Taylor v. Koenigstein, 128 Neb. 809, 260 N.W. 544 (1935).
16. Cardinal v. Cardinal, 131 S.W.2d 1005 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939); Jones v. Selman,
109 S.W.2d 1003 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
17. Snead v. Scott, 182 Ala. 97, 62 So. 36 (1913).
18. Taylor %. Koenigstein, 128 Neb. 809, 260 N.W. 544 (1935).
19. Francis v. Ferguson, 246 N. Y. 516, 159 N.E. 416 (1927); In re Fullmer, 319
Pa. 192, 197 Atl. 545 (1935); In re Murphy, 191 Wash. 180, 71 P.2d 6 (1937).
[VOL. 3
1957] RECENT CASES
the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act,' describes the conduct of one who
converts a bailed chattel to his own use. Smith v. United States, 233 F.2d
744 (9th Cir. 1956).
Some .courts hold that § 2312 of the "Dyer Act," is to be strictly construed
Vis common law larcency,2 that is, "a felonious taking and carrying away of
personal goods of another, with intent to convert to the taker's use."'  They
have held the defendant not guilty under § 2312 where the automobile was
obtained by passing worthless checks,4 by fraudulent pretenses,5 or where the
car was rented.e They predicate their decisions upon the doctrine that criminal
statutes are to be strictly construed against the imposition of criminality; so
that the defendent is not guilty of larceny where he obtained the automobile
lawfully in the first instance.'
Other courts have said that the meaning of § 2312 is extensive enough to
cover all wrongful and unlawful taking of property, including embezzlement.8
These courts have held that where the automobile was obtained lawfully by
rent,9 by bailment,1o or by borrowing," and was unlawfully retained, the de-
fendant was guilty under § 2312 in spite of the absence of felonious intent at
the taking.
Congress in enacting the "D'er Act", was concerned with the large scale
theft of automobiles, and the frustration of state law enforcement agencies
which occurred when the automobiles were transported across state borders.
There appears to be nothing in the debate on the bill inconsistent with the
idea that the word "stolen" is meant to include the crime of embezzlement.'-
It is interesting to note also that the common law definitions of the word
"stolen" do not exclude embezzlement. Funk and Wagnall defines "steal" as
"to take that to which one has no right, especially that which belongs to an-
other, without permission or authority. .. "1 while Webster takes the view
that the word "steal" is general for pilfer, filch, or embezzle. 14
Tustice Cardozo stated the problem well: "The distinctions between larceny
and embezzlement, now largely obsolete, did not ever correspond to any
essential difference in the character of the acts or their effect on the victim.
The crimes are one today in the common speech of men as they are in moral
1. 62 Stat. 806 (1948), 18 U. S.C. 1 2312 (Supp. V, 1952) amending 41 Stat. 324
(1919). Whoever transports in interstate commerce a motor vehicle or aircraft, knowing
the same to have been stolen, shall be fined not more than $5,000, or imprisoned not more
than five years, or both.
2. Hand v. United States, 227 F.2d 794 (10th Cir. 19.5.5); Murphy v. United States,
206 F.2d 571 (5th Cir. 1953); Ackerson v. United'States, 185 F.2d 485 (8th Cir. 1950);
Hite v. United States, 168 F.2d 973 (10th Cir. 1948).
3. Black, Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1951).
4. See Murphy v. United States, 206 F.2d 571 (5th Cir. 1953).
5. See Hand v. United States, 227 F.2d 794 (10th Cir. 1955); Hite v. United States,
168, F.2d 973 (10th Cir. 1948).
6. See United States v. Kratz, 97 F. Supp. 999 (D.' Neb. 1951).
7. Murphy v. United States, 206 F.2d 751, 753 (5th Cir. 1953) (dictum).
8. Wilson v. United States, 214 F.2d 313 (6th Cir. 1954); United States v. Ad-
cock, 49 F. Supp. 351 (W. D. Ky. 1943); Breece v. United States, 218 F.2d 819 (6th Cir.
1954) (dictum); Collier v. United States, 190 F.2d 473, 477- (6th Cir. 1951) (dictum);
United States v. Sicurella, 187 F.2d 533, 534 (2d Cir. 1951) (dictum); Davilman v.
United States, 180 F.2d 284, 285 (6th Cir. 1950) (dictum).
9. See Davilman v. United States, 180 F.2d 284 (6th Cir. 1954).
10. See Breece v. United States, 218 F.2d 819 (6th Cir. 1954).
11. See Stewart v. United States, 151 F.2d 386 (8th Cir. 1945); United States v.
Adcock, 49 F. Supp. 351 (W. D. Ky. 1943).
12. See 58 Cong. Record 5470-5478, 6433-6435 (1919).
13. Funk and Wagnall, New Standard Dictionary of the English Language (1952).
14. Webster, New International Dictionary (2d ed. 1953).
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quality.'IO Whether or not such a conclusion is true, it is certain that the effects
of embezzlement and larceny are identical in so far as the lawful owner of
property is concerned; in either case, he has been deprived of his property.
To avoid the confusing distinctions between guilty intent at the taking and
after-acquired guilty intent, New York in 1942 recodified into a single theft
statute all crimes of a theft nature without reference to the time of forming
the guilty intent.' 6 While New York's solution to the problem appears to be
the most simple, the decision in the instant case appears to be equally effective.
JOHN A. DOEHRn.
EQUITY - INJUNCTIONS - EQUITABLE RELIEF NOT AVAILABLE FOR VIOLATION
oF CIVIL RIGHTS STATUTE. - Plaintff, a negro woman, brought an action
against the operator of a privately owned amusement park to enjoin him from
refusing her admittance to the park because of her race. An Ohio statute pro-
vides that the proprietor of a place of amusement who denies to a citizen,
except for reasons applicable to all, the full enjoyment of the facilities shall be
subject to fine and imprisonment, or in the alternative to the payment of
damages.' The Ohio Supreme Court, two justices dissenting, held that the
remedy provided by the statute was exclusive and an additional remedy by
way of injunction was not available. Fletcher v. Coney Island, 165 Ohio St.
150, 134 N.E.2d 371 (1956).
The holding in the principal case is based on the rule that where a statute
ceates a new right the remedy provided is exclusive. The common law recog-
nizes an exception to- this rule where the remedy provided is inadequate, and
allows an injunction as an ancillary remedy unless excluded expressly or by
necessary implication. 2 Some-American jurisdictions have allowed the remedy
which would best protect the plaintiff's right irrespective of the fact that the
statute did not expressly grant such remedy. *
One writer has said that the statutory grant of a right should be considered
as distinct from the remedy provided. 4 If this were not true, the possibility
15. Van Vechtcn v. American Eagle Fire Ins. Co., 239 N. Y. 363, 146 N.E. 432, 433.
(1925).
16. See N. Y. Consolidated Law Service, Penal Law, 1 1290 (1951).
1. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2901.35 (Baldwin 1953) "No proprietor or his employee,
keeper or manager of an inn, restaurant, eating house, barber shop, public conveyance by
air, land, or water, theater, store or other place for the sale of merchandise, or any othet
place of public accommodation or amusement, shall deny to a citizen, except for reasons
applicable alike to all citizens and regardless of color or race, the full enjoyment of the'
accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof, and no person shall aid or in-
cite the denial thereof. Whoever violates this section shall be fined not less than fifty nor
more than five hundred dollars or imprisoned not less than thirty nor more than ninety
days or both, and shall pay not less than fifty nor more than five hundred dollars to the
person aggrieved thereby to he recovered in any court in the county where the violation
was committed."
Id., § 2901.36 "Either a judgment in favor of the person aggrieved, or the punishment
of the offender upon an indictment under section 2901.35 of the revised code, is a bar to
further prosecution for a violation of such section." (Italics added).
2. Cooper v. Whittingham, 49 L. J. 752 (Ch. 1880).
3. See Amos v. Prom, 117 F. Supp. 615 (N. D. Iowa 1954); Powell v. Utz, 87
F. Supp. 811 (E. D. Wash. 1949); Orloff v. Los Angeles Turf Club, 30 Cal.2d 110,
180 P.2d 321 ,(1947); Humburd v. Crawford, 128 Iowa 743, 105 N.W. 330 (1905);
Bolden v. Grand Rapids Operating Corp., 239 Mich. 318, 214 N.W. 241 (1927); Grannon
v. Westchester Racing Assn., 16 App. Div. 8, 44 N. Y. Supp. 790 (App. Div. 1897),
rev'd on other grounds, 153 N. Y. 489, 47 N.E. 869 (1897); Everett v. Harron, 380 Pa,
123, 110 A.2d 383 (1955); Randall v. Cowlitz Amusement Inc., 194 Wash. 82, 76 P.2d
1017 (1938).
4. 1 Lewis, Sutherland on Statutory Construction, 549 (2d ed. 1904).
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